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OPINION PIECE

TAKING RESPONSIBILITY
Robert M. Ackerman*
Communitarians have suggested that a balance
must be struck between individual rights and the public
welfare, and that our self-seeking tendencies must sometimes be set aside in pursuit of the common good. Government is often (although not always) the mechanism through
which common interests are advanced. An abdication of
government responsibilitymay result in disaster,as was the
case with respect to Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath.
At the other extreme, the accumulation of too much power
in government can also bring about catastrophic consequences, as in the case of the 1986 Chernobylnuclearplant
disaster in the Soviet Union. A balance must be struck
between the extremes of government passivity and "all
government, all the time. " Traditionally, this tension has
been framed as one of libertarianismversus collectivism; in
current American political parlance, that of liberalism
versus conservatism. But communitarians are more likely
to view these issues in terms of an adjustment of interests,
to be determined in the political arena, than as a clash of
rights, to be adjudicatedin the courtroom. This essay sug-

*Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania
State University; B.A., Colgate University; J.D., Harvard Law School.
The author wishes to thank Kathryn Mason and Joel Samuels for their
invaluable research assistance. The author also wishes to thank Amitai
Etzioni, Hans Joas, Bodo von Greiff, Wolfgang Muller, and Wibren
van der Burg for their comments and encouragement. Earlier versions
of this essay appeared on the Communitarian Network webpage available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-ccps/WinnerofCommunitarianEssayContest.htm
and in German translation sub nom Verantwortung iibernehman,
2/2007 Leviathan 143.
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gests a communitarianframework for analyzing the boundaries ofgovernment power and responsibility.
Part I of the essay focuses on the Katrina disaster
and the abdication of government responsibility on the
local, state, and national levels both before and after the
hurricane.
Part II suggests the Chernobyl experience as a
counterpoint, cautioning us regarding the dangers of too
much government control.
Part III explores the underlying attitudes toward
government in the United States, suggesting that hostility
toward government has resulted in a "tragedy of the commons" that undermines the public welfare.
PartIV outlines a series of communitarianguidelines for principledconsiderationof the properrole of
government.
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DELUGE AND DELUSION.

Do you know what it means to miss New Orleans?1

On Monday, August 29, 2005, at 6:10 a.m. Central
Daylight Time, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of
the United States, with the center of the storm making landfall a few miles east of New Orleans, Louisiana. Katrina
had been a Category 5 hurricane while in the Gulf.2 Its
intensity had diminished to Category 4 and then to a strong
Category 3 hurricane (with maximum sustained winds of
175 miles per hour) by the time it reached Louisiana and
Mississippi. 3 But Katrina's wind speed (the basis of its
numerical classification) told only part of the story. By any
measure, Hurricane Katrina was an exceptionally large
storm. Hurricane-force winds extended about 100 statute
miles away from her center, and tropical storm-force winds
extended about 230 miles away. 4
The residents of the Gulf States had been warned
for several days about Katrina's imminent landfall, but it
was not until 10:00 a.m. on Sunday, August 28, that New
Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin saw fit to order the first-ever
mandatory evacuation of the city. As a consequence, when
the hurricane struck, "[a]pproximately one-fifth of New
Orleans's 460,000 residents were still in the city, and a
similar proportion were left in each of the surrounding
parishes (approximately 900,000 people lived in these suburbs)." 5 Katrina's winds caused some destruction (including tearing a hole in the roof of the Louisiana Superdome,
1 LOUIS ARMSTRONG, Do You KNOW WHAT IT MEANS TO MIss NEW
ORLEANS? (Bluebird RCA 1946).
2 RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT'L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL REHURRICANE KATRINA 1 (Aug. 2005).
PORT:
3

id.

4 Id. at 1-4, 23-30.
5 DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA,
NEW ORLEANS, AND THE MississiPPi GULF COAST 89-90 (2006).
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where thousands of residents had taken shelter), but the
greatest devastation in New Orleans and elsewhere was a
consequence of the storm surge caused by the hurricane.
The Gulf of Mexico, Lake Pontchartrain, and a system of
rivers and connecting canals overflowed their banks and
breached the levees protecting New Orleans (much of
which lies below sea-level) and the surrounding communities from their waters. Low-lying neighborhoods in New
Orleans, the surrounding communities, and coastal areas in
Mississippi and Alabama were inundated and remained
underwater for several days. Thousands of citizens were
left stranded, or worse, drowned in the floodwaters. Their
desperation was exacerbated by what appeared to be an
utter breakdown of emergency rescue operations. State,
local, and national officials lacked organization, supplies
failed to reach their destinations, and public transportation
out of the city failed to materialize until several days after
the storm. New Orleans' predicament took on racial overtones, as a disproportionately large number of its stranded
residents were African-American. The loss of life, damage
to property, and overall devastation of New Orleans and
other parts of the Central Gulf Coast amounted to the worst
natural catastrophe in the history of the United States. The
tragedy painted a disturbing picture of disparity between
rich and poor, white and black, and a governing apparatus
that was too paralyzed to provide effective relief to beleaguered citizens.
The floodwaters had not receded before the fingerpointing began. Katrina was a natural disaster, but there
was a pervasive sense that the tragedy was unnecessarily
compounded by human failure. Hurricane Katrina would
raise anew questions about the role of government and
civic responsibility in America, issues of ongoing interest
to communitarians. The events surrounding Katrina suggested serious lapses in areas of official responsibility at
several junctures, both before and after the storm. A few
prominent examples are as follows:
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* Years of dredging by the United States Army Corps
of Engineers had kept the Mississippi River open
for shipping. It had also removed millions of tons
of silt necessary to replenish the wetlands of the
Mississippi River Delta. Petroleum exploration had
caused more subsidence, further compromising the
wetlands. As a consequence, Louisiana lost 1900
square miles of wetlands between 1930 and 2004.6
The wetlands had acted as a natural sponge, absorbing storm surges and protecting New Orleans and
other populated areas. With this natural sponge severely eroded, almost nothing could absorb Katrina's storm surge before it struck the populated areas
of the Gulf Coast. Additionally, subsidence reduced the heights of the levees by as much as three
feet below their original design.7
" Further damage to the wetlands was caused by the
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR. GO), a canal
completed by the Corps of Engineers in the 1960s. 8
MR. GO also acted as a funnel for water being
forced up toward the city, leading to the breaches
that would cause massive flooding in New Orleans'
Lower Ninth Ward. 9
" Levees constructed by the Corps of Engineers to
protect New Orleans from flooding were reinforced
by sheet piles consisting of interlocking steel sup-

6 Joel

K. Boume, Jr., Gone with the Water, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct.
2004, at 88.
7 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
OF
THE NEW ORLEANS AND SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA HURRICANE

1-4 (June 1,2006).
K. Bourne, Jr., New Orleans:A PerilousFuture, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 2007, available at

PROTECTION SYSTEM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

8 Joel

http://ngn-nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0708/feature1/index.ht ml.
9Id.
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ports.10 An investigation subsequent to Katrina has
shown that the sheet piles "were too shallow to prevent [a] flow" of water underneath them. 1 "Tests.
. found that sheet piles reached only 10 feet below
sea level in some spots, far less than would protect
the city.' 12 The Corps' designs had called "for a
depth of 171 feet, but even that, the investigators
say, would have been too shallow."' 13 "[I]n spots
where the levees" were subsequently repaired, the
Corps of Engineers called "for sheet piles to be driven to depths of 51 to 65 feet."' 4 Soil material incorporated into the levees was also found
inadequate for the circumstances. 15 The levees
therefore lacked adequate foundation support.
While Katrina's storm surge would have crested the
levees in any event, the waters would have likely
receded without serious flooding had the levees remained intact. Lacking adequate support, however,
the levees gave way, causing several New Orleans
neighborhoods (in particular, the predominately
African-American Lower Ninth Ward) to be inundated with water. Not long before the storm, a request for $105 million to improve the levee system
had been reduced by the administration of President
George W. Bush to $40 million, despite re eated
warnings regarding the region's vulnerability.

'0John Schwartz & Christopher Drew, Louisiana'sLevee Inquiry

FaultsArmy Corps, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at A28.
llId.
12

13

Id

1d.

14

1d.

15INDEPENDENT LEVEE INVESTIGATION TEAM, UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

AT BERKELEY, NEW ORLEANS SYSTEMS HURRICANE KATRINA XVIII
APP.
AT
16

1-7 (2006).

Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., United States of Shame, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.

3, 2005, at A21.
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" The levees were subject to a confusing and inefficient administrative structure. A tangled web of local authorities, often preoccupied with unrelated
projects, shared authority over the levees with the
Corps of Engineers. Responsibility was fragmented
and unclear. With so many in charge, nobody was
really in charge. The various structures built to contain hurricanes did not function as a system and
lacked redundancy. Compromises in one part of the
"system" produced by political forces or environmental concerns were not compensated for elsewhere, where other agencies might be in control.
* Global warming may have played a role in Katrina's having become such a powerful storm. "[S]ea
surface temperature records show that the oceans
[and other large bodies of water (like the Gulf of
Mexico)] are more than 1 degree F[ahrenheit] warmer on average today to a century ago." 17 "Because
hurricanes draw strength from heat in ocean surface
waters," warmer water potentially "generate[s]
more powerful hurricanes."1 8 Water temperatures
fluctuate in any event, "[b]ut the higher the average
[temperature,] the more likely the water will be
warm enough to produce a strong storm on any given day during the hurricane season." 19 So while we
cannot say with any assurance that global warming
caused Katrina, the probability of severe hurricanes
like Katrina was significantly enhanced by global
warming. This idea may help explain why, for the
first time, the Tropical Prediction Center (the agen17Pew

Center on Global Climate Change, Katrina and Global Warm-

ing: Was Katrina'sPower a Productof Global Warming?, availableat

http://www.pewclimate.org/specialreports/katrina.cfm (last visited Aug.
23, 2007).
18id.

19Id.
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cy that assigns names to hurricanes) ran all the way
through the alphabet in 2005.20
While public authorities had ample warning of Hurricane Katrina, they failed to mobilize a transport
system equal to the need for evacuation. Many of
the poor residents of the region (and in particular
the poor African-American residents of the region)
lacked automobiles of their own. These people
were dependent upon public transportation to leave
the city. 2 1 Little, if any such transportation materialized. Two days before the hurricane, Amtrak
routes that normally serve New Orleans were terminated in Memphis and Atlanta.2 2 (French tourists
stranded in New Orleans before the storm went instinctively to the railroad station and were bewil20

Hurricane names are agreed upon at international meetings of the

World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and once a storm system
with counterclockwise circulation reaches wind speeds of thirty-nine
miles per hour or greater, the Tropical Prediction Center (TPC) in
Miami, Florida, assigns the system one of the pre-determined names.
National Hurricane Center, Naming Hurricanes,available at
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/basics/naming.shtml (last
visited June 26, 2007). The most active hurricane season, prior to
2005, was in 1933 when the season produced twenty-one named tropical cyclones; in 2005, the season produced twenty-eight named systems, running the TPC completely through the WMO's alphabetized
list of names and making 2005 the most active season to date. ERIC S.
BLAKE, ET AL., THE DEADLIEST, COSTLIEST, AND MOST INTENSE UNITED STATES TROPICAL CYCLONES FROM 1851 TO 2006 14 (Apr. 2007),

availableat http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/DeadliestCostliest.shtm.
21 Jason DeParle, What Happens to a Race Deferred, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
4, 2005, § 4 at 1 (reporting that even among the poor in New Orleans,
African-Americans were less likely than whites to own automobiles)
availableat
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/04/weekinreview/04depa.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2008).
22 Amtrak, Service Alert: Hurricane Katrina Update, available
at
http://www. amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=Amtrak/am2
Copy/SimpleCopy_.Popup&c=am2Copy&cid=1093554014709 (last
visited Jan. 10, 2008).
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dered to find it closed.23 ) Hundreds of the city's
school buses remained in their parking lots; these
buses became disabled when the lots were
flooded. 24 The City ordered an evacuation, but
made no provision to assist residents in evacuation
efforts. Indeed, buses out of the city did not materialize for several days after the hurricane struck.2 5
With 30% of National Guard units tied up in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and the White House claiming ignorance of severe flooding until several days after
the storm, the federal government was slow to mobilize for an evacuation. 26
Government on all levels (i.e., the city, the state,
and the federal government) was particularly impotent when it came to providing aid to people in the
beleaguered area after the hurricane hit. Those
stranded in New Orleans were told to report to the
Louisiana Superdome, where they would find provisions. As many as 50,000 people heeded that call,
only to find a facility that was ill-prepared to accommodate them.27 The hurricane caused a power
outage, and with it, the absence of air-conditioning,
leaving people to bake in the Louisiana heat while
trapped inside the indoor stadium. 28 Basic sanitation soon broke down in the huge facility. Reports
23 Dan Baum, New OrleansPostcard:Consulat DInfluence, THE NEW
30. This episode illustrates a major difference between American and European expectations regarding public
transportation.
24 BRINKLEY, supra note
5, at 359.
25
/d. at 386.
YORKER, Mar. 6, 2006, at

Julian Borger & Duncan Campbell, Why Did Help Take So Long to
Arrive?, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 3, 2005, at 4.
27 See Robert Tanner, Thousands Evacuatedfrom New OrleansSaturday, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 3, 2005, availableat
http://www.wwlt v.com/sharedcontent/nationworld/katrina/stories/0903
05ccKatrinawcMainstory. If76bb86.html.
28 BRiNKLEY, supra note 5, at 191-93.
26

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

21

of assaults, rapes, and even murders were rampant;
while most of these reports were later discredited, a
sense of anarchy was prevalent.29 Several thousand
additional victims sought refuge in New Orleans'
Ernest N. Morial Convention Center, from which
reports of anarchy surpassed those coming from the
Superdome. (At least one confirmed murder did
occur at the Convention Center . 30) Anarchy was also evident in the streets of New Orleans, where
many business establishments fell victim to looters. 3 1 Some of these "looters" could hardly be
blamed, as they were procuring food, water, and
other supplies necessary to sustain the stranded
population. 32
" Other aspects of the rescue, such as relief for victims stranded in the floodwaters, were similarly disorganized. Approximately one-third of the members of the New Orleans Police Department deserted their posts. 33 National Guard units were slow
in coming; the efforts of these and other law enforcement officials who arrived from as far away as
Oregon and Puerto Rico were uncoordinated, lacking any central command.34 Some of the law enforcement units seemed more intent on quelling
rioting than on providing relief to flood
non-existent
35
victims.
* In at least one instance, citizens of New Orleans
found themselves to be victims of bad neighbors.
Id. at 193, 240, 476.
Brian Thevenot & Gordon Russell, Reports of Anarchy at Superdome
Overstated, SEATTLE TIMEs, Sept. 26, 2005, at Al.
31 BRINKLEY, supra note 5, at 200-05, 276.
32
Id. passim; Tanner, supra note 27.
33 Dan Baum, Deluged: When KatrinaHit, Where Were the Police?,
THENEW
YORKER, Jan. 9, 2006, at 50, 60.
34
29
30

35

Id.

id.
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Attempting to leave the stricken city and looking for
high ground, several hundred New Orleans residents tried crossing the Mississippi to Gretna, Louisiana, where they were met by a sheriff's
department intent on turning them back.3 6 Escape
from the devastated city, even for those willing and
able to walk, was thereby blocked.
B.

37
"It ain't my fault. ,

The devastation of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath suggest a natural disaster the consequences of which
were severely exacerbated by an abdication of governmental responsibility on all levels. That the human failure was
primarily one of government is hard to deny. While individuals had, to be sure, taken it upon themselves to live in
New Orleans and elsewhere on the Gulf Coast, they did so
in reliance on a system of levees, canals, navigation, and
transportation engineered, built, and maintained primarily
by government. Indeed, only government could have constructed and maintained a system of such scale. Yet the
American government, which had, only a few months earlier, raced halfway around the world to provide aid for victims of a giant tsunami, was now found seriously wanting
when faced with a natural disaster at home.
The immediate target of public wrath was Michael
D. Brown, Director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and a man clearly in over his head. In the days
following Katrina's onslaught, Brown was depicted as
studiously ignorant about the conditions in New Orleans,
more concerned about his attire and dinner schedule than
36

Chip Johnson, PoliceMade Their Storm Misery Worse, S.F. CHRON,

Sept. 9, 2005, availableat http://sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file-/c/a2005/09/09/BAGL1EL1 KH1.DTL.
37 SMOKEY

2000).

JOHNSON, IT AIN'T

MY FAULT (Night Train International
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the coordination of relief for the stricken region. Nevertheless, President Bush, in cheerleader mode, proclaimed,
"Brownie, you're doing a heck of a job[!]" as New Orleans
sank into the mire. 38 Shortly thereafter, Brown would find
himself in the position of scapegoat for the muffed operation, becoming comic fodder for late-night television hosts
in a Warholian moment of infamy. He would resign later
in September, only to establish
a business as a disaster
39
consultant.
preparedness
But to blame a single individual for the disaster was
to miss the point. Brown was representative of two much
larger phenomena: a diffusion of responsibility among a
patchwork quilt of federal, state, and local authorities; and
an administration in Washington that appeared to be less
than fully committed to some of the most essential functions of government. 40 Evidence of the latter problem had
previously surfaced in connection with the war in Iraq.
While many would come to dispute the need to invade Iraq
in 2003 and to deplore the manipulation of intelligence
used to justify the invasion, few would argue that national
defense is not an essential function of government. Yet
even as it schemed to carry on a war against Iraq, the administration failed to adequately equip the military to proceed with its mission. Military experts lamented the
inadequate number of troops deployed for the mission; the
understaffing violated a core principle of the "Powell Doctrine," which espoused the use of force that is "overwhelm-

Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President
Arrives in Alabama, Briefed on Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 2, 2005),
38

availableat

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/O9/2OO50902_2.htm-.
39 Mark

Leibovich, A Punch Line Who Refuses to FadeAway, N.Y.
Aug. 26, 2006, at Al1.
Krugman, Op-Ed., Killed By Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2005, at A21.
TIMES,
40 Paul
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ing and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy., 41
Despite months of planning, soldiers lacked body armor
and other essential equipment.4 2 Events suggested the
absence of any plan to secure either Iraq's munitions or its
national treasures from looting as the conquest of that
country was completed. The looting in turn helped supply
a protracted insurgency about which the administration had
43
been warned, but which did not figure into its plans.
Even the administration's highest priorities seemed
thwarted by either a lack of foresight or a fundamental
unwillingness to commit public resources to essential functions.
The "less government the better" philosophy of the
Bush Administration-a recurring theme of Republican
Party rhetoric since 1980 44 -resulted in a lack of seriousThe Powell Doctrine was espoused by General Colin Powell, while
serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1991. Other elements of the Powell Doctrine: that military action should be used only
as a last resort and only where there was a clear risk to national security
by the intended target; that there must be strong support for the campaign by the general public; and that there must be a clear exit strategy
41

from the conflict. See Colin Powell, U.S. Forces: ChallengesAhead,

71 FOREIGN

AFF.

32 (1992).

When the Secretary of Defense was called to account for this, his
response was "You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army
you might want or wish to have at a later time." Eric Schmitt, Troops'
42

Queries Leave Rumsfeld on the Defensive, N.Y.

TIMES,

Dec. 9, 2004, at

Al (quoting Secretary Rumsfeld).
43 Prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq predicted
insurgency in the wake of the conquest of Iraq. STAFF OF S. SELECT
COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 110TH CONG., REPORT ON PREWAR
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ABOUT POSTWAR IRAQ (Comm.

Print
2007), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/prewar.pdf.
44 The Republican administration of President Ronald Reagan, elected
in 1980, reduced non-military governmental expenditures, but continued the military buildup begun by its predecessor. This buildup is
widely credited with ending the Cold War with a Soviet government
that was unable to compete. Jeffrey W. Knopf, Did Reagan Win the
Cold War?, STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, Aug. 2004, availableat
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ness about the responsibilities of government and the staffing of the administration by those, like Mr. Brown, for
whom a government post was a reward for party loyalty
rather than competence, a path to power but not public
service. 45 In the conservative catechism, "good government" was an oxymoron, so government might as well
serve as an object of plunder, rather than as a form of public service.
None of this, however, was likely to surprise proponents of social choice theory. As Professor Frank Michelman has explained, social choice theorists explain public
policy choices as manifestations of "no public or general or
social interest,...

only concatenations of particular inter-

ests or private preferences., 46 If government was to be
viewed not as an instrument to serve the people, but rather
as an opportunity to advance one's personal interests, it was
easy to see how an agency like FEMA could be transformed into a fiefdom bereft of a long-term plan for disaster response, or for it to engage in what New York Times
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.nilsi/2004/aug/knopfAUG04.pdf. For a

discussion of Soviet failures, see infra text accompanying notes 76-83.
4'The practice was repeated in other sectors of government. Most

notably, staffing at the Justice Department, which traditionally had
been the bailiwick of career professionals, took on a partisan edge
during the administration of George W. Bush. See CQ Transcripts
Wire, Goodling Testifies Before the House Judiciary Committee, THE
WASH. POST, May 23, 2007, availableat
http://www.washingtonpost.comwp-

srv/politics/transcripts/goodlingtestimony_052307.html; Margaret
Talev & Marisa Taylor, U.S. Attorneys Saga Exposes Weakened Justice
DepartmentIndependence, THE NEWS-SENTINEL, June 18, 2007,

available at
http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/newssentinel/news/editorial/

7386647.

htm. Federal legislation prohibits appointment of certain federal employees on the basis of political affiliation. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(l)(E)
(2007).
46 Frank I. Michelman, PoliticalMarkets and Community SelfDetermination:Competing JudicialModels ofLocal Government
Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148 (1977).
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columnist Maureen Dowd called "a chilling lack of empathy combined with a stunning lack of efficiency." 47 Indeed,
the entire Homeland Security apparatus of which FEMA
was a part, conceived as a necessary device to avert future
September 11-type disasters, had become, in short order, a
repository for congressional pork barrels, with rural police
and fire departments in favored districts awash in funds
while their urban counterparts (the more likely targets of
future terrorist attacks) struggled to make-do. 48 Meanwhile, the federal government, rather than shrinking in size
(a modest accomplishment of the Clinton Administration)
actually grew, as domestic expenditures, 49 and along with
them, the budget deficit, soared during the first five years
of the George W. Bush presidency. 5 1 As more than one
47 Maureen Dowd, supra note 16, at A2
1.
48 Dean E. Murphy, Security Grants Still Streaming to Rural States,

N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 2004, at Al. In Katrina's wake, Republicangoverned Mississippi received a disproportionately larger amount of
federal relief than Democratically-governed Louisiana. See Larry
Copeland, In Mississippi,Katrina Recovery GainingSteam, USA
TODAY, July 24, 2006, availableat
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-07-24-missrebuilds-x.htm; Adam Nossiter, Senators atLouisianaHearing Criticize
FederalRecovery Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at A16.
49
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL BUDGET DATA, 8 TABLE
7
(2006) availableat http://www.cbo.gov/budget/data/historical.pdf (last
visited Feb. 3, 2008).
50 See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007: Summary of Tables 315, Table S-3 (2006)
availableat
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/budget/tables.pdf
!last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
1
Belatedly, some Republicans came to lament the Bush Administration's enlargement of government and Congressional use of budgetary
earmarks. In explaining how the conservative movement has been
undermined, conservative activist Richard Viguerie states,
[Wihen you add everything up, what you have is a
massive overreach of executive powers, and massive
overspending by people who claim they're conservatives.
Every President, with hardly any exceptions, will take as
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wag has noted, "For years, Republicans had told us that
government was bad; when they came to power, they
proved it." As a consequence Americans, who had raced
halfway around the world to aid victims of an Asian tsunami eight months prior to Katrina, seemed incapable of taking care of their own when disaster struck the Gulf Coast.
At a Congressional hearing following the Katrina
disaster, FEMA Director Brown alleged that Louisiana
Governor Kathleen Blanco and New Orleans Mayor Ray
Nagin (both Democrats) bore most, if not all the blame, for
the failures in the response to Katrina, and that Brown's
own only mistake had been not to realize sooner the
inability of Blanco and Nagin to perform their duties. 52 In
subsequent testimony, Brown blamed the Department of
Homeland Security and his White House patrons-but not
himself-for the federal government's lack of preparation
A
and its delay in providing relief and rescue. 53
Congressional
committee,
composed
entirely
of
Republicans, would focus its blame on Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff.54 According to the panel's
chairman, Mr. Chertoff had "primary responsibility for
much power as he gets. That's what Presidents do. Bush
has tried more than most. And it was supposed to be the
Republicans in Congress who would do oversight of the
President, so that he wouldn't get away with too much
abuse of power. But they abdicated that role. It was all
about the maintenance of power, and now look where
they are.
Jeffrey Goldberg, Party Unfaithful: The Republican Implosion, THE
NEW
YORKER, June 4, 2007, at 40, 45.
52

HurricaneKatrina: The Role of the FederalEmergency Management
Agency: H. Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation
for & Response to HurricaneKatrina, 109th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2005)

(testimony
of Michael D. Brown, former FEMA Director).
53
HurricaneKatrina: The Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership:S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & GovernmentalAffairs, 109th Cong. (Feb.

10, 2006) (testimony of Michael D. Brown, former FEMA Director).
See Spencer S. Hsu, KatrinaReport Spreads Blame: Homeland
Security, Chertoff Singled Out, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2006, at Al.
54
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managing the national response to a catastrophic disaster,"55 yet, as the committee reported, he had handled his
decision-making responsibilities "late, ineffectively, or not
at all.
A Bush Administration report focused on a need
for administrative reorganization that would divide various
functions among several government agencies, some in
different departments-this only a few short years after a
major government reorganization through which the Department of Homeland Security was created.57 A Senate
report subsequent to Katrina recommended abolishing
FEMA and creating another Homeland Security unit, a
"National Preparedness and Response Authority." 58 Apparently, performance would be improved by rearranging
the deck chairs on the Titanic.
Government lapses in connection with Hurricane
Katrina were by no means the exclusive domain of the
Republican Party. Under both major parties, the Corps of
Engineers had developed a reputation for heavyhandedness, enjoying hegemony over flood control and
paying little heed to the environmental consequences of its
actions, while feeding off pork-barrel appropriations from
Democratic, as well as Republican, Congresses. 59 Katrina
HurricaneKatrina: The Role of the Departmentof HomelandSecurity: Select BipartisanComm. to Investigate the Preparationfor and
Response to HurricaneKatrina, 109th Cong. (Oct. 19, 2005) (opening
55

statement of Tom Davis, chairman).
56

A FAILURE

OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT ON THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-

H. REP. No. 109-377, at 2-3 passim
(2nd Sess. 2006); see Hsu, supra note 54 at Al.
7 George W. Bush Administration, The Federal
Response to Hurricane
Katrina:Lessons Learned, 65-82 (2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-leamed.pdf.
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA,

58 S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC.

& GOVERNMENTAL

AFFAIRS,

A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S. REP. No. 109322,
RECOMMENDATIONS 607 (2006).
59

HURRICANE KATRINA:

TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE

& NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N,

CROSSROADS: CONGRESS, THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS, AND WASTEFUL WA-
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found Democrats in state and city governments in Louisiana and New Orleans dropping the ball in planning, execution, and emergency response. Nevertheless, the inept Ray
Nagin would be re-elected as New Orleans' mayor in May
2006, demonstrating the tendency of the electorate to close
ranks around homegrown incompetence.
C.

Photo-op politics.

American politicians tend to deal with squeakywheel, crisis-of-the-moment issues that are conducive to
"photo opportunities" and other media coverage, but not to
engage in long-term planning or quiet reflection. Much
like corporate officers whose visions runs only to the end of
the current quarter, politicians tend to address the hotbutton issue of the day, with their responses tailored to
exploit whatever momentary political advantage can be
obtained, rather than taking a long view of the public interest. Be it the devastation of Katrina, a coal mine disaster
that takes a dozen lives, 60 or even a professional quarter-

TER PROJECTS

2-3 (2000), availableat

http://www.nwf.org/wildlife/pdfs/Crossroads.pdf (last visited Feb. 3,
2008).

Representative of this behavior was the response to the Sago Mine
disaster in January 2006, which took the lives of twelve miners. Ian
Urbina & Andrew W. Lehren, U.S. Is Reducing Safety Penaltiesfor
Mine Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at Al "[T]he operator [of the
Sago Mine] had been cited 273 times since 2004. None of the fines,
[however,] exceeded $460." Id. The New York Times reported that this
was typical of the pattem of reduced mine safety enforcement by the
Bush Administration, which, even after imposing fines far smaller than
the maximum allowable, was lax in their collection. Id. The Congressional response was to introduce legislation to increase the maximum
fines allowable, not to demand better enforcement of existing law. Id.
60

Lest one surmise that the Bush Administration's tendency to compromise with mine operators reflected the needs of a struggling industry,
one should note that the International Coal Group, which operates the
Sago Mine, reported $110 million in net profits during 2005. Id.
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back's involvement in a dog fighting ring,6 ' the typical
legislative response is a predictable one: press conferences,
legislative hearings, grandstanding, and still more legislation, rather than effective oversight regarding implementation of legislation already in effect.
The Bush
Administration may have been derelict in attending to disaster relief after Katrina, but it retained enough media
savvy to stage a dramatically-lit and heavily scripted Presidential television address from Jackson Square in New
Orleans a few days after the storm.
That publicity-mongering and point-scoring is a bipartisan affair that can be demonstrated by the grandstanding that attended the arrival of $3 per gallon gasoline prices
in the spring of 2006. Democrats were eager to blame the
cost of gas (still substantially less than what Europeans
were accustomed to paying) on price-gouging by the oil
companies and the short-sightedness of the Bush Adninistration and to urge adoption of deficit enhancement measures such as "a sixty-day halt on collecting federal gasoline
taxes." 62 The Bush Administration, in a conspiracy with
Big Oil, was depriving Americans of their God-given right
to drive, and there were political points to be scored.
Meanwhile, Republican leaders proposed a $100-per-driver
tax rebate, 63 presumably to be financed by more federal
61A more

recent example of Congressional grandstanding was Senator
John Kerry's pledge to introduce tougher federal legislation to ban dog
fighting. Senator Kerry's pledge came in the wake of revelations of a
dog-fighting ring that included Atlanta Falcons quarterback Michael
Vick, who eventually pled guilty to federal charges. See Senator John
Kerry's Online Office, Kerry Asks NFL Commissioner to Immediately
Suspend Vick Over "Sickening"Dogfighting Case, July 20, 2007,

http://kerry.senate.gov/cfm/record.cfm?id=279464.
62 Edmund L. Andrews & Michael Janofsky, Second Thoughts in
Congress on Oil Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at Al.
63 Press Release, United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Domenici Introduces the Gas Price and Rebate Act of
2006 (Apr. 27, 2006) availableat
http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.
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borrowing from East Asian banks. 64 "'Political anxiety in
an election year is to blame for a lot of the bad bills Congress passes,' said Representative Jeff Flake," an Arizona
Republican who opposed this short-lived proposal. 65 Leaders of neither major party took pains to point out the need
to develop a real national energy policy, to promote conservation (and with it, public transportation), and to invest
in alternative sources of energy-in other words, anything
requiring6 planning or sacrifice on the part of the American
people.

6

This infantile attitude toward governance seeks refuge in "painless" solutions, in which constituents are
treated not as citizens, but consumers; not as responsible
participants in a common enterprise, but as supplicants
hoping to feed from a public trough. Rather than demand
of the American public, as President Kennedy did, that we
"ask not what [our] country can do for [us], but what [we]
can do for [our] country,",67 present-day politicians ask
Americans to consider whether we are "better off now than

Detail&PressReleaseid=234941 &Month=4&Year=2006&Party= 1
2ast visited Feb. 4, 2008).
See U.S. Treasury Department, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury
Securities (May. 15, 2006), availableat
http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt. (charting major foreign holders of
treasury securities from November 2006 to November 2007).
65 Carl Hulse et al., Republicans Drop a Tax Plan After Business Leaders Protest,N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at Al.
66 Lamenting the "utterly shameless, utterly over-the-top Republican
pandering and Democratic point-scoring that have been masquerading
as governing in response to this energy crisis," New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman called for the creation of a third political
party because neither major party is willing to tell Americans what they
need to hear: that a solution "requires sacrifice today for gain tomorrow." Thomas L. Friedman, Let's (Third) Party, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2006, at A25.
67 President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961).
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we were four years ago." 68 War is waged in Iraq, for a
number of reasons, some justified, some contrived, but
instead of urging us to shared sacrifice, the administration
and Congress rewards us (or at least the most affluent
among us) with tax reductions. Pork barrel expendituresnot for improved levees in New Orleans, but for bridges to
nowhere in Alaska-grow to budget-busting proportions
through an undemocratic "earmarking" process, all to be
financed not through user fees or taxes, but through the
blue smoke and mirrors of supply-side economics and fanciful growth projections. In the days following Katrina's
onslaught, Thomas Friedman observed,
Besides ripping away the roofs of New Orleans, Katrina ripped away the argument that
we can cut taxes, properly educate our kids,
compete with India and China, succeed in Iraq,
keep improving the U.S. infrastructure, and
take care of a catastrophic emergency - without
putting ourselves totally into the debt of Beijing.
So many of the things the Bush team
has ignored or distorted under the guise of
fighting Osama were exposed by Katrina: its
refusal to impose a gasoline tax after 9/11,
which would have begun to shift our economy
much sooner to more fuel-efficient cars, helped
raise money for a rainy day and eased our dependence on the world's worst regimes for
energy; its refusal to develop some form of national health care to cover the 40 million uninsured; and its insistence on cutting more taxes,
even when that has contributed to incomplete
Soon to be President, Ronald Reagan, asked Americans to consider,
"whether you are better off today than four years ago." President
Ronald Reagan, Reagan-Carter Presidential Debate (Oct. 28, 1980).
68
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levees and too small an Army to deal with 69Katrina, Osama and Saddam at the same time.
Critics of the war in Iraq have complained that it
has left the American military stretched too thin.70 But the
stretch is not beyond that which we are capable; it is simply
71
beyond that which we have been willing to commit.
Today's global military commitments are fulfilled not by
sons and daughters drafted from the citizenry-at-large, but
by an "all-volunteer" army, consisting primarily of lowincome people with few economic alternatives, gleaned
from America's urban ghettoes and rural communities.72 A
less populous, less affluent United States of America was
able to stretch its military around the globe during World
War II, but that was an enterprise to which the nation was
fully committed, for which the administration in power had
prepared the American people to sacrifice, and in which
most American families had a direct stake, often through
one or more of its members in military service. Americans
would have been similarly disposed to sacrifice after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. But instead of
imploring us to shared sacrifice, the President told Americans to "live your lives and hug your children., 73 The tax
breaks and pork-barrel expenditures continued. A critic of

69

Thomas L. Friedman, Osama and Katrina,N.Y.

2005,
at A25.
70
See generally LYNN E. DAVIS,

TIMES,

Sept. 7,

ET AL., STRETCHED THIN: ARMY

(2005) (prepared for the United
States Army).
71This lack of commitment may find its roots in the omission of Powell
Doctrine principles from war planning. See generally Powell, supra
note 41.
72 The army's current recruiting slogan, An Army of One, hardly brings
to mind the more communitarian, brothers-in-arms philosophy of what
Tom Brokaw and others have called "the Greatest Generation."
73George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001).
FORCES FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS
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the Bush Administration captured its post-September
11
74
party!"
Let's
war.
at
"We're
words,
the
attitude with
Granted, it is difficult for a president to tell the
American people that it is time for us to eat our vegetables.
But we have gorged on a diet of sweets and fats for too
long. Indeed, the recent upswing in obesity among Americans, young and old-and with it, the growth in related
maladies such as diabetes and heart disease-is an apt
75
metaphor for our debt-plagued government and society.
The time has come for all of us to take responsibility.
II.

COUNTERPOINT: THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER.

A.

A nuclear whirlwind.

In the context of responsible governing, Katrina
was, both literally and figuratively, a reaping of the whirlwind. Poor planning and neglect had come home to roost
in the flooded streets of New Orleans in a visible, demonFriedman, supra note 66 (referring to a statement by Joel Hyatt).
Conservative activist Richard Viguerie has pointed out that Bush has
followed in the "guns-and-butter" footsteps of President Lyndon B.
Johnson, abjuring the approach of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Harry S. Truman, and Ronald Reagan, who cut discretionary domestic
spending as they increased defense spending. RICHARD A. VIGUERIE,
CONSERVATIVES BETRAYED 25 (2006).
75 An article by Jackson Lears espouses this concept.
Americans are awash in red ink. Consumer indebtedness
is soaring, the savings rate is down to zero and people are
filing for bankruptcy at record rates. To many observers,
these are symptoms of cultural decline, from sturdy thrift
to flabby self-gratification--embodied in the current obesity epidemic. The fattest nation on earth is also the
greediest consumer of global resources and now is borrowing more than ever to satisfy its appetites.
Jackson Lears, The Way We Live Now: The American Way of Debt,
N.Y. TIMEs MAG., June 11,2006, at 13. The article goes on to
suggest that commentators have historically lamented Americans'
tendency toward indebtedness. Id. at 13-16.
74
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strable way. Were the solution to dysfunctional government simply more government, or the consolidation of
power in a single, central government, the remedy could be
derived fairly easily, but solutions to complex problems are
seldom this facile. The past century has provided many
lessons regarding the danger of imposing an all-powerful
government as alpha and omega of all matters. Few were
as vivid as the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster, which
rocked the Soviet Union in April 1986. The explosion at
the nuclear facility near the Ukrainian city of Chernobyl
immediately killed thirty-one people, required the evacuation of 135,000 others, and contaminated an area roughly
the size of England.76 The precise number of cancers and
other illnesses attributable to the disaster will never be
ascertained, but the numbers are probably in the thousands,
with genetic damage possibly being passed down through
several generations. A United Nations report issued in the
fall of 2005 suggested that 4,000 people would, in the end,
die from diseases caused by direct exposure to the radiation.77 Greenpeace, an environmental group not immune
from the use of hyperbole, released its own response in
April 2006 (twenty years after the explosion), claiming that
in the final analysis Chernobyl would kill at least 90,000.78
Chernobyl was the product of a centrally planned
economy in which the government based in Moscow was
the first and last authority. Without private enterprise, a
free press, or internal checks and balances to constrain it,
there was nothing to prevent the Soviet state from engaging
76

NEA

COMMITTEE ON RADIATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH, CHERNOBYL

TEN YEARS ON RADIOLOGICAL AND HEALTH IMPACT

18, 27-28 (1995),

available at http://www.nea.fr/html/rp/chemobyl/vrml/chemobyl.htnl.

Press Release, World Health Org., et al., Chernobyl: The True Scale
of the Accident (Sept. 5,2005).
77

78 GREENPEACE, THE CHERNOBYL CATASTROPHE:
CONSEQUENCES ON
HUMAN HEALTH 23 (I. Blokov et al. eds., 2006), availableat

http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/intemational/press/reports/cher
nobylhealthreport.pdf.
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in a reckless course of action. The state could do no
wrong; there was nobody to compete with it, nobody to
criticize it, no mechanism to check its excesses.7 9 Marx
and Engels had instructed us that in time, the state would
just wither away; in the meantime, it imposed a structure
that dominated human endeavor to a greater degree than
anything mankind had previously seen, with a death grip
that stifled initiative, ambition, and progress.
To be sure, Chernobyl was not the only disaster
caused by Soviet-style totalitarianism. The Soviet invasions of Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), Stalin's massacre of the kulaks, and the repression of the
Gulag were among hundreds of examples of the excesses of
the Soviet state. But Chernobyl demonstrated that Sovietstyle totalitarianism was not even technically competent.
Military parity with the West would, for a time, mask the
Soviet Empire's economic weakness, but the Chernobyl
disaster revealed that even the vaunted Soviet nuclear program was a fagade covering a flawed and creaky infrastructure. The "workers' paradise" promised by Lenin and
Stalin spewed forth not only the devastation of Chernobyl
but also the environmental wasteland that covered much of
Eastern Europe and Russia by the time of the Soviet Empire's demise circa 1990. If the Katrina disaster presents a
sorry case of abdication of government responsibility, the
Chemobyl catastrophe stands as a harsh illustration of what
can occur when a society and its economy are characterized
by "all government, all the time."

79 The

regulatory process in the United States is not without its critics.
But the worst American nuclear plant mishap, Three Mile Island in
1979, paled in comparison to the Chemobyl disaster. Just one year
after the Three Mile Island incident, the author moved to a location just
twenty-five miles upwind of Three Mile Island, where he and his family have enjoyed a healthy portion of their lives. For all its shortcomings, a combination of private enterprise and government regulation
appears to have averted more serious nuclear disasters.
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In Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, contemporary
observers saw Chernobyl as a clear signal that the Soviet
Union was not the technological powerhouse it had been
assumed to be. The nuclear plant disaster humbled the
Kremlin and emboldened those who would challenge the
Soviet Empire, causing it to topple within a few short years.
Similarly, in the aftermath of Katrina, people in the United
States and abroad came to wonder whether the world's only
remaining global superpower had the will as well as the
wherewithal to confront serious domestic challenges.
Chernobyl exposed raw the shortcomings of a "people's
dictatorship" that was more bluff than substance; in Katrina's aftermath, Americans could not help but wonder
whether we had lost the ability to take care of our own.
The Soviet experience demonstrated the danger of too
much government; the American that of not enough. In
both cases, disaster revealed underlying flaws in governing
philosophy. In both Moscow and Washington, the same
truth was exposed: the emperor had no clothes.
We hesitate to paint with too broad a brush. There
are nuances that work against our grand theory. Critics of
the United States Army Corps of Engineers have long
complained about that agency's unfettered hegemony over
flood control. 80 The single-mindedness of the Corps' undertakings, often oblivious to environmental consequences,
was more reminiscent of the blinders-on mentality of the
Soviet management philosophy than the chaotic mismanagement displayed by other American government agencies in Katrina's immediate aftermath. And while the
governments of New Orleans, Louisiana, and the United
States may have failed Katrina's victims, they were generously assisted by governments in other states, most notably Texas, which housed thousands of homeless people and
opened the schoolhouse doors to their children. Americans
80 TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE & NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, Supra

note 59.
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also responded admirably to Katrina through nongovernmental efforts, raising disaster relief funds and volunteering in large numbers to aid the victims and rebuild
the Gulf Coast. 81 Indeed, the very existence of several
layers of responders, some public, some private, assured
that some relief would arrive for Katrina's beleaguered
victims. Two centuries ago, Alexis DeToqueville observed
that Americans had constructed a strong civil society to
compensate for the weakness of their government.82 That
structure has provided a measure of salvation in the wake
of Katrina and other demands to which our governments,
federal, state, and local, have been slow to respond.
While the Soviet government's initial reaction to
Chemobyl was the sort of tight-lipped non-disclosure characteristic of a totalitarian regime, Moscow's long-term
response was somewhat more enlightened and humane than
that which one might expect from an "evil empire." Within
a few days after the explosion, the Soviet government ordered and conducted mass evacuations and provided the
means for people to leave the contaminated area and to
sustain their lives thereafter. In so doing, it undertook a
81 Particularly

noteworthy were the efforts of the Mormon Church,
which quickly sped supplies and relief workers to the beleaguered Gulf
Coast. The Mormon Church-in its ability to mobilize its members for
the common good-demonstrates some of the finest aspects of civil
society. See All About Mormons, Mormon Humanitarian Efforts,
available at

http://www.allaboutmormons.com/mormon-humanitarian-service.php
(last visited June 26, 2007). The church's critics would say that it also
displays communitarian's darker side, with evidence of strong outgroup antagonisms. That is far more likely to have been true in the past
than the present. See Douglas 0. Linder, The Mountain Meadows

Massacre of 1857 and the Trials of John D. Lee: An Account (2006),
availableat
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mountainmeadows/lee

account.html.
82

1 ALEXIS

DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

rald Bevan trans., Penguin Books Ltd. 2003).

passim (Ge-
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role not regarded as extraordinary for a socialist state. In
the cases of both Katrina and Chernobyl, problems resulting, at least in part, from either an excess or lack of government involvement were ameliorated through more
communitarian solutions: in one case, the compassionate
ministries of civil society and private charity; in the other,
the distributive justice philosophy of a socialist state. In
the end, our salvation lies in neither over-dependency on
government nor the abandonment of government responsibility, but rather somewhere in the middle. 83
B.

Averting Collapse.

In his excellent book, Collapse, Jared Diamond describes the sad fate of several of the world's civilizations,
each of which ultimately failed to thrive because of an
Diamond
unwise allocation of limited resources. 84
attributes societal collapse to a number of factors, including
environmental damage, climate change, hostile neighbors,
decreased support by friendly neighbors, and society's
response to environmental problems. 85 He acknowledges
that much environmental degradation is natural or inadvertent, but that it is the variable of human response that can
spell the difference between a society that disintegrates and
one that continues to thrive. 86 Diamond documents how in
environments as diverse as Easter Island and Norse Green83

Indeed, by the mid-1980s the Soviet Empire was neither as monolith-

ic nor as autocratic as it had once seemed. Nikita Khrushchev's "goulash communism" was evolving into Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost
and, ultimately perestroika. The meltdown of autocracy had begun
prior to the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl, although the potency of
civil society in opposition to totalitarian government was more evident
in Warsaw Pact states such as Hungary and Poland than in the Soviet
Union
itself.
84
JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR

(2005).
SUCCEEDpassim
85

id.

86 id.
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land, ruling elites commandeered scarce resources for
themselves, neglecting the people without whose labor and
support the enterprise was doomed.87 As a consequence, it
was only a matter of time before resources ran dry and the
civilization collapsed. 88 The theory that collapse (or, in
less extreme cases, major economic deprivation) was not an
inevitable consequence of natural conditions is demonstrated by the differing fortunes of two peoples or political
systems inhabiting the same environment, such as the
Norse and Inuit in Greenland, or the Dominican
Republic
89
and Haiti on the Caribbean island of Hispaniola.
A relatively small, elite group might temporarily
thrive by hoarding resources and exploiting the populace.
For a time, less fortunate people will perform menial jobs,
serve in an "all volunteer" army, pledge fealty to a "worker's paradise," and pay taxes in the forlorn hope that they,
too, will someday share in the community's wealth. But
faith in the community and participation in the common
enterprise ultimately collapses unless the community is
reasonably responsive to the needs of all. Even Machiavelli recognized that "[a] wise prince will establish institutions
that can protect lives and property, respect different spheres
of social organization, and help his subjects pursue their
livelihoods." 90 Benjamin Franklin put it more colloquially
during the American Revolution: "We must indeed all hang
91
together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately."
87 id.
88 id.
89 id.
90

JOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN

IDEA 58 (1999). Ehrenberg offers the following quotation from Ma-

chiavelli's The Prince: "A prince should also show his esteem for
talent, actively encouraging able men, and honoring those who excel in
their profession." Id.
91 Benjamin Franklin, Remarks at the signing of the Declaration of
Independence (July 4, 1776). See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 323 (Elizabeth Knowles ed. 1999).
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Ultimately, we are all in the same boat. Better for us to all
row together to safety than
to drop our oars and cannibalize
92
the weakest among us.
That is not to say that we all should be strapped into
our seats, beating out a cadence of strokes called out by a
single coxswain seated up front. The failure of communism has demonstrated how a centrally-controlled economy,
answering to the beat of a single drummer, stifles individual initiative and sucks the oxygen out of community. We
seek other models. Diamond calls our attention to the
Netherlands, where rich and poor alike realized over the
years that they would have to collaborate on an extensive
system of dikes and pumps in order to reclaim the land
from the sea. 93 A large storm that took 2,000 lives in 1953
prompted the Dutch to redouble their efforts; a Dutch academician-friend of mine explains that the Deltawerken (the
massive reinforcement of the dykes and the damming of
some estuaries) stemmed in part from a "Churchillian feeling that there was a war against the water, which required
sacrifices from all for a major effort to prevent any disaster
like that in the future." 94 Diamond quotes his Dutch
friend's description of life in the reclaimed lands, or "polders":
In the Netherlands, we have [an] expression,
'You have to be able to get along with your
enemy, because he may be the person operating
the neighboring pump in your polder.' And
For the legal consequences of the latter, see Her Majesty the Queen
v. Dudley, (1884) 14 Q.B.D 273 (D.C.).
93 DIAMOND, supra note 84.
94 E-mail from Wibren Van der Burg, Tilburg Univ., to author,
(Feb.
11, 2007) (in author's files). The legendary British Prime Minister's
name was invoked to signify the gravity of this immense national
effort, led by "a reasonably effective government that saw itself as the
leading agency in rebuilding the country and a minimally just and
solidaristic society after WWII." Id.
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we're all down in the polders together. It's not
the case that rich people live safely up on tops
of the dikes while poor people live down in the
polder bottoms below sea level. If the dikes
and pumps fail, we'll all drown together .... If
global warming causes polar ice melting and a
world rise in sea level, the consequences will
be more severe for the Netherlands than for any
other country in the world, because so much of
our land is already under sea level. That's why
we Dutch are so aware of our environment.
We've learned through our history that we're
all living in the same polder, and that our survival depends on each other's survival. 95
Comments Diamond:
That acknowledged interdependence of all
segments of Dutch society contrasts with current trends in the United States, where wealthy
people increasingly seek to isolate themselves
from the rest of society, aspire to create their
own separate virtual polders, use their own
money to buy services for themselves privately,
and vote against taxes that would extend those
amenities as public services to everyone else.
Those private amenities include living inside
gated communities, relying on private security
guards instead of the police, sending one's
children to well-funded private schools with
small classes rather than to the under-funded
crowded public schools, purchasing private
health insurance or medical care, [and] drinking
bottled water instead of municipal water. . ..
Underlying such privatization is a misguided
95 DIAMOND, supra note 84, at 519-20.

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

43

belief that the elite can remain unaffected by
the problems of society around them: the attitude of those Greenland Norse chiefs who
found that they had merely bought themselves
96
the privilege of being the last to starve.
The collective effort in the Netherlands shaped an
environmentally conscious community in which capitalism
has nevertheless thrived more than in most places on
earth. 97 That care for the collective good would be conducive to a thriving capitalist economy should not really come
as a surprise. Indeed, no lesser proponent of capitalism
than Adam Smith recognized long ago that
[n]o society can surely be flourishing and
happy, of which the far greater part of the
members are poor and miserable. It is but
equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe,
and lodge the whole body of the people,
should have such a share of the produce of
their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged. 98
As we shall see, however, those who would promote individual initiative and an equitable distribution of resources
face special problems in the United States.

96

Id. at 520.
My Dutch friend explains that the polder boards may have been the
first democratic institutions in the Netherlands and account for the
country's egalitarian and democratic culture. Van der Burg, supra note
94.
97

98 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 33 (1776).
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IN SEARCH OF A COHERENT GOVERNMENT ROLE.

A.

A nation of tax protestors.

The United States of America is a nation founded
by tax protesters. The cry of the American Revolution was
"no taxation without representation"-acall for representative democracy at least as much as a revolt against taxes; a
political protest as much as a tax revolt. Nevertheless, antitax, and with it, anti-government, sentiment is very much a
part of the national DNA. King George III and his troops
represented repressive government; ergo, government must
be inherently repressive. 99 The centralization of power in
particular was to be avoided. Hence, a loose confederacy
of states was formed to succeed British imperial rule.
When that proved ineffectual, a federal government was
formed, in which constituent states would nevertheless
remain sovereign and retain many important government
powers. Government power was to be divided among governments with different competencies (i.e., the "division of
powers" between the national government and the states);
within each government, "separation of powers" was to
keep any one branch from exercising too much power. A
Bill of Rights, setting forth individual civil liberties in the
form of limitations on government power (e.g., "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." 100), became an
important part of the constitution of the new republic.
Government was a necessary evil, but an evil nevertheless,
to be constrained and divided.
99 A variation on this type of thinking might be found in contemporary

Russia. Under Soviet rule, Russians were told that capitalism was
corrupt; capitalists were portrayed in caricature as greedy, dishonest,
and underhanded. With the decline and fall of communism, Russians
seem to have believed their propagandists and embraced the most
corrupt form of capitalism. The caricature has become the fact.
100 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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The result was a country in which criticism, suspicion, and even derision of government is regarded as patriotic. A special target of this derision is the central
government in Washington. Politicians from Thomas Jefferson to George W. Bush have campaigned against Washington (the government, not the man, although there is
reason to believe that Jefferson secretly schemed against
the man as well' 0 1). Ronald Reagan built his political career on the following idea: the problem is not solved by
government, the problem is government.
Anti-government sentiment is the exclusive domain
of neither the left nor the right. Democrats, like Jefferson
(author of the Kentucky Resolutions10 2), Madison (principal drafter of the limited-powers Constitution), Jackson (foe
of the Bank of the United States), Bryan (the prairie populist), and Carter have dueled in anti-government rhetoric as
have Republicans like the Tafts (three of them), Coolidge
("the chief business of the American people is
ness" 103), Reagan, and the Bushes (again, three of them).
The rhetoric often takes on a populist, anti-lawyerly complexion. Peanut farmers (Jimmy Carter) and bodybuilderscum-Hollywood celebrities (Arnold Schwarzenegger) repeatedly remind voters, during political campaigns that
they are neither lawyers nor politicians, as if professional
training in the law or a life of public service is a form of
taint. But American lawyers, too, regard it as their sacred
duty to protect citizens against government power. The
101See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS

482-83 (Touchstone 2001).

Kentucky Resolutions, like Madison's Virginia Resolutions,
stated a case for nullification of acts of Congress deemed unconstitutional by the state legislatures. Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions, in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1JANUARY 1798 TO
31 JANUARY 1799 550-56 (Princeton Univ. Press 2003); WILLIAM J.
102The

WATKINS, JR., RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS AND THEIR LEGACY 170-71 (2004).
103President Calvin Coolidge, Address to the American Society of

Newspaper Editors in Washington D.C. (Jan. 25, 1925).
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crusading attorney, in both fact and fiction-Clarence Darrow, Atticus Finch, Thurgood Marshall-is seen at his
heroic best when defending the criminally accused against
an abusive government or challenging unfair or discriminatory government practices.
Even our national symbols have an antigovernment, rugged individualist aura about them. The
vigilant serpent of "Don't Tread on Me" fame was succeeded by a solitary eagle, a free-flying bird of prey, not a
pack animal like the wolf or a communitarian species like
the beaver (although Oregonians favor the latter). The
Father of Our Country, George Washington, is portrayed as
a Cincinnatus, disdainful of high office, eager to return to
the plow, accepting both a military commission and the
Presidency only with great reluctance. 104
Yet for all the bashing of government, we expect
government to perform when the chips are down. At one
time, apparently, it did. In the days following the San
Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906, with the city in ruins
and thousands left homeless, at least one citizen was moved
104

The myth is only partially correct. Washington did resist imperial

trappings and titles as President and established the two-term tradition
(ignored by Franklin Roosevelt, then codified in the Twenty-second

Amendment). But he was a master politician, inventing several government institutions that survive to this day, successfully balancing off
personalities as diverse and contentious as Hamilton, Jefferson, and
Adams, and fending off all sorts of challenges. As for his military
command, Washington showed up at the Continental Congress in 1775
dressed in full military officer regalia. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, 1776,
49-50 (Simon & Schuster 2005). What could he have been suggesting?
To his credit, Washington established the appropriate image
for the general-cum-politician in America. Military leaders who have
obtained high political office in this country have been the modest, selfeffacing, peace-loving sorts who have seen war and wish not to revisit
its horrors. We tend to elect and admire the Washingtons, Grants,
Eisenhowers, and Powells, not the strutting, autocratic McClellands,
MacArthurs, Pattons, and LeMays. We run (as we should) from the
man-on-horseback, the Caesar, or Napolean who will sweep us off our
feet and lay waste to our liberties.
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But don't worry; govern-

105

The observation seems to have
ment is looking out."
been accurate. Federal troops, after some initial blunders,
soon thereafter brought relief to a homeless and stranded
population. Within ten days, a new trolley line was up and
running; the twenty-eight thousand buildings destroyed by
the quake would be replaced by 20,500 new ones within
three years. 10 6 Public and private resources combined to
build a new City by the Bay. Even a corrupt municipal
administration rose to the occasion.
The recent New Orleans experience stands in sharp
contrast. Even now, two years after Katrina, deliverance
seems almost as remote as in the days immediately following the storm. As of yet, no clear-cut game plan or consensus as to how to rebuild the city and its environs exists.
Instead, the Big Easy seems to be adrift. 107 Part of the
problem is a cacophony of interest groups unwilling to lay
their respective demands aside for the common good. But
a century of disillusionment has also driven American government from a "can do" to a "won't do" mentality. 108
Americans spend 350 days a year bashing government, starving it of resources, at least in those areas in
105PBS American Experience: The

GreatSan FranciscoEarthquake

(produced and directed by Tom Weidlinger), transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/earthquake/filmmore/pt.html (Mar. 20,
2006).
106

id.

107
A metaphor for this drift may be the shrimp boats washed ashore

during Katrina, which remained tangled in the trees in Gulf Coast
communities ten months later. Dan Barry, 100-Ton Symbols of a
Recovery Still Suspended, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2006, at Al.
'0'
Perhaps we are just sadder but wiser. During the "can-do govemment" era of the New Deal, Americans from Franklin Roosevelt to
Woody Guthrie extolled the virtues of massive federal reclamation and
irrigation projects such as the Grand Coulee and Bonneville Dams.
Today, we have come to recognize that an environmental price must be
paid for such "progress." We may have become less sure-headed and
more circumspect about such matters.
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which intervention might matter most. We spend the remaining two weeks deploring government's inability to
respond to the crisis of the moment: a hurricane in the Gulf,
landslides in California, wildfires in the Rockies, floods in
New England. Of course, few people really want the cessation of all government. Most societies have been formed
by people who recognized the need to band together to
protect common interests. Those societies quickly adopted
some sort of governance system. It may have been more or
less authoritarian in structure; it may have been more or
less oppressive to individual citizens or outsiders who come
into their midst; it may have been more or less tolerant of
free thinking or non-conformity on the part of individuals.
All too frequently, the broad common interests that created
the governing instrument in the first place have been abandoned in the course of rent-seeking efforts of individuals
and limited interest groups, or in selfish efforts to accumulate wealth or power on the part of individuals. Thus, in the
Soviet Union, Marxist-Leninism, a flawed, authoritarian
form of government that nevertheless had the welfare of the
masses as its core principle, quickly gave way to Stalinism,
a more oppressive form of Marxism whose chief aim
seemed to be the preservation in power of a totalitarian
leader. 109 In Africa, the promise of liberation from colonial
rule frequently turned sour, as despotic rulers plundered
national assets for personal gain. In America, the Republican Party, an organization formed with the noblest of
aims-the curtailment of slavery and the enhancement of
opportunity-has lately fallen into the hands of a coalition
of corporate oligarchs and religious
zealots, with adverse
110
consequences for the Republic.
109 These circumstances have been portrayed in an allegorical fashion in
literature. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (Penguin
Group 1945).
110 For a detailed description of this phenomenon, see generally KEvIN
PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY (2006).
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A Hobbesian view of the world would suggest that
this is the natural state of things. Under Thomas Hobbes'
philosophy, power is accumulated in a governing authority
because men would otherwise be at each other's throats.
Life is "nasty, brutish and short," and people willingly cede
whatever natural rights they possess in return for the protection of a leviathan who will shield them from external
and internal threats.111 Under this view, the pursuit of selfinterest on the part of the ruling oligarchy is but a deal
struck with the devil. Some crumbs might be thrown to the
populace, but its claim to civil liberties is abandoned in
favor of protection against the Hun, the Turk, the Bolsheviks, or Al-Qaeda. The more liberal Lockean view regards
things differently. According to John Locke, individuals
group together to serve their mutual interests, including
self-protection, but in doing so they retain certain basic
civil liberties. 112 These "natural rights" are not to be interfered with by the governing powers; to the extent intrusions
are permitted, they must be balanced against civil liberties. 11 3 The bombing of Pearl Harbor may justify war on
Japan, but it does not justify the internment of American
citizens of Japanese ancestry. Taxes may be collected and
people may be conscripted into military service, but the
government may not arbitrarily drag us from our homes at
night or beat confessions out of its citizens.
B.

Rights and responsibilities.

Communitarians are apt to reject the authoritarianism implicit in the Hobbesian view and are therefore more
likely to embrace the Lockean, "natural rights" view. But
communitarians will be quick to add that with rights come
111THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. 1 ch. 13 (1651).
112 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING

(1690).
13 Id.

HUMAN

UNDERSTANDING
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responsibilities, and that the assertion of individual rights
does not mean disregard for the needs of the community at
large. In America, however, the impulse against invasive
government power runs strong-so strong that we are reluctant to have government play the major role in promoting social welfare that is taken for granted in most
economically advanced societies. Our health care system is
a prominent example of this phenomenon. Resistance to a
comprehensive national health care system has been articulated on a number of grounds: the right to chose one's own
physician, the right of doctors to be independent contractors, the efficiencies and choices arguably provided by an
array of competing health insurance plans. But communitarians are apt to downplay the "rights talk," recognizing,
as Mary Ann Glendon does, that most public controversies
are best resolved through an adjustment of competing interests. 114 Refraining the issue as an interests-based discussion frees us to consider whether nationally-guaranteed
health coverage might benefit the nation as a whole and
whether a single-payer (or even just a single-form) health
insurance program might be more efficient than a system in
which each doctor must employ a cadre of specialists just
to process the forms required by a patchwork quilt of insur115
ers. Our Canadian neighbors enjoy universal health care
and more-more extensive public transportation,1 16 large
subsidies for higher education, 117 and stacks of firewood
free for the taking in national parks. Nevertheless, my
occasional forays to the north have unearthed no sense of
114

MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF

POLITICAL DISCOURSE 15 (1991).
115

Judy Foreman, Why CanadiansAre Healthier,THE BOSTON GLOBE,

Feb. 10, 2004, at C2.
116 Michael R. Baltes, The ImportanceCustomers Place on Specific
Service Elements of Bus Rapid Transit, 6 J. OF PUB. TRANSP. 1, 5, 18
(2003).
117 Martin Trow, From Mass Higher Educationto UniversalAccess:
The American Advantage, 37 MINERVA 303, 304, 317-319 (1999).

4:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 51

oppression or restraint of freedom on the part of Canadian
citizens. Perhaps the absence of the responsibilities of a
superpower-and the hubris that goes with it-provides
our Canadian neighbors with an air of freedom and a lighter
step to their feet. Or perhaps it is a stronger sense of community that allows them to recognize that health care is a
universal need, the availability of which should be dependent upon neither wealth nor employment status.
C.

The tragedy of the commons.

Communitarian theory suggests that when possible,
government responsibility should be vested in the smallest
units, as they are most likely to be responsive to the needs
of the community. 118 But communitarianism sometimes
requires broader government responsibility as to human
needs. In America, the impulse against centralization of
government power runs almost as strong as the antipathy
toward government in general. Whether our federal system
is the cause or the effect of resistance to central authority,
there is great reluctance to place the federal government in
charge of many aspects of public life that are entrusted to
central authority in other countries. School finance is a
prominent example of this phenomenon. In France (to cite
just one case), public education is regarded as a major responsibility of the central government. 119 Approximately
two-thirds of all school funding comes out of Paris, and the
quality of one's education is not a by-product of the wealth
of one's hometown. 20 In America, the regard for local
control is strong. Control over and financing of schools is
118 AMrrAI ETZIONI, The Responsive CommunitarianPlatform: Rights
and Responsibilities, in THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNrrY: RIGHTS, RESPON-

SIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 260 (1993).

119 Embassy of France in the United States, Education in France: The

School System, http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/edu-fr.asp (last
visited
120 id. Jan. 15, 2008).
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largely a local matter. 121 The state might take some inter-

est, but Washington is banished to the far comers of public
education. 122 The quality and type of education one receives in America thereby becomes largely a function of the
wealth and attitudes of one's local community-and the
results, of late, have been deplorable. 123
They have been deplorable at least in part because
many localities-even many that could not be considered
''poor" by any means-starve their public school systems.
This starvation subsists because while the greatest carping
about government power, size, and expenditures is reserved
for the federal government, people have the most direct
influence over taxes and expenditures on the local level. In
some states, like New York and New Jersey, voters must
approve school budgets through direct referendum. 124
Elsewhere, a school board member is only a telephone call
121 Some exceptions exist. Hawaii, for example, fmances all public

education through the state treasury. See Haw. Const. art. 10, § 1. See
generally HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1303 (Supp. 2006) (articulating

how the school budget and general fund are estimated).

122 Washington's primary involvement appears to be in the form of

unfunded mandates: decrees that states and local school districts must
comply with certain requirements as a condition for federal funding,
then paltry appropriations with respect to such funding. One such
example can be found in provisions for special education for students
with disabilities. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004);
see also No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115
Stat.
1425 (2002).
12 3

See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMER-

SCHOOLS 3-5 (1992) (detailing inequities in America's public
schools). In Chile, students, who are painfully aware of such inequities, have recently taken to the streets in opposition to a Pinochet-era
law that delegates education funding to local communities and private
enterprise. See Larry Rohter, ChileansPromised a New Deal: Now
Striking Youth Demand It, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 2006, at Al 1. Thus, an
avowedly
socialist government has fallen short of the egalitarian ideal.
124
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 13-17 (West 1999); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
2022 -2023 (McKinney 2000).
ICA'S
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away-and unlike the congressional representative, she is
likely to answer the phone personally. The tragedy of the
commons takes hold, as elderly and childless voters, not
seeing a direct stake in the education of young people, rail
against high taxes, "bloated" school budgets, and "overpaid" teachers. 125 Having little recourse over state and federal
budgets, they use what leverage they can to control expenditures at the local level.
For decades, America's public schools were subsidized by the practice of sex discrimination. Women, largely excluded from professions such as law and medicine,
turned to nursing and teaching, for which they (and the
smaller number of males who opted for these callings)
accepted wages that would have been below market in a
truly free market, i.e., a market free of discrimination.
Now, with the more lucrative professions open to women,
the private-sector nursing market has begun to pay competitive wages. 126 Teachers, most of whom work in a publicly-financed school system, continue to earn depressed
wages. The profession is gradually depleted of its best
talent, who seek more lucrative positions elsewhere. To
extend the commons analogy, it now costs more to grow
the grass, but the public is unwilling to recognize the scarcity of seed and foot the bill.
What is lacking here is a broad sense of community.
Last year my new research assistant, recently exposed to
communitarianism, asked me how broadly we can define
community. A core question, to be sure. With respect to
some interests, it might be altogether appropriate to define
one's community as narrowly as one's immediate family,

121 The tragedy of the commons takes hold when a public resource (i.e.,
the commons) is depleted because individuals are unwilling to regulate
their use or pay the price necessary to sustain the resource. See Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
126 Cheryl L. Mee, Salary,NURSING 2005, Oct. 2005, at 46, 48.
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or one's church, or one's neighborhood. 127 But some functions (and I would contend that education is one of them)
require the financial commitment of an entire nation. For
still other purposes, such as the environment, our concerns
are that of a global community. In matters such as education and the environment our interests are so interwoven
that it is, in the long run, just as self-defeating to narrow
one's perspective to one's family or even one's town as it
was for the Norse chiefs described by Diamond to horde
Greenland's scarce resources. 128
The problems of health care and public education
have together come to a head in my local school district.
Our local teachers worked last year without a contract, and
our little town endured a short strike, because the school
board insisted that the teachers contribute more of their
own funds to their health insurance plan.129 While a contribution in the amount demanded by the board was unprecedented for our area's public schools, the squeeze is
not unlike those faced by any number of employers, locally
and nationally. General Motors, Delta Airlines, Wal-Mart,
and our local grocer and automobile mechanic all must face
rising health care premiums while selling goods and services in a competitive environment. In America, the mix of
public and private resources has generally served us well,
but an over-reliance on employers as the major source of
health insurance has crippled them against international
competition, subjected them (like our doctors) to increasing
amounts of red tape, and exacerbated labor strife all over
America. Greater recognition of public and national responsibility in this regard may not only make health care
accessible to all; it might allow Americans to get on with
127 ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. & ROBERT M. ACKERMAN, LAW AND

COMMuNY: THE CASE OF TORTS 5 (2004).
128

DIAMOND, supra note 84, at 248-76.

129 Full disclosure requires me to note that my wife is one of our local

school teachers.
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business in a more globally competitive manner. Only our
distaste for "big government" stands in the way.
D.

"Painless"solutions.

Some of the rancor in our own school district is a
product of uncertainty regarding the future of Pennsylvania's system of public school finance. Recent experience
in that area provides some contrasts of particular interest to
communitarians. For the past several years, a Democratic
governor and a Republican legislature have tangled over a
funding scheme that would employ gambling proceeds
from slot-machines to reduce the tax burden. This "painless" approach to public finance works as a regressive tax
on the poor and hides the true cost of government services.
Rarely mentioned is the moral question of whether we
should finance our children's education through a bluesmoke-and-mirrors scheme dependent upon gambling
money drawn disproportionately from a low-income clientele.
A more communitarian approach to school finance
is demonstrated by a program adopted by some fourteen
Pennsylvania school districts. These districts accept inkind services from senior citizens in lieu of taxes. 130 Seniors serve as teachers' aides, lunchroom monitors, crossing guards, and tutors in exchange for tax forgiveness. The
need for tax relief on the part of skilled, public-spirited
citizens on fixed incomes is matched with the schools'
needs for a variety of services that might otherwise not be
provided. And, as Robert Putnam suggests in Bowling

130 Madelyn Pennino, Young and old, learning-Retireestutor at

school's 'lab', INTELLIGENCER J., Jan. 28, 2008, at B 1; Dena Pauling,
Seniors Who Volunteer May Get $500 Tax Break, Aging Homeowners
Could be Paidfor Work, CENTRE DAILY TIMES, Sept. 16, 200, at 1.
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Alone, the direct engagement of these citizens provides
31
value in a way that mere check-writing cannot. 1
IV.

RECURRENT COMMUNITARIAN THEMES.

We can no longer delude ourselves with sugarcoated facts, "painless" solutions, or other blue-smoke-andmirrors exercises, nor will the old partisan rhetoric or "left
versus right" labels suffice. Instead, we must begin to
consider the role of government with maturity and honesty.
Throughout this essay, we have encountered a number of
communitarian themes that can help us address this issue in
a principled manner, unencumbered by conventional political rhetoric or alignments. 132 They may be summarized as
follows:
A.

How much government?

This essay opened with the sad examples of Katrina
and Chernobyl, because they demonstrate the unfortunate
results that can be obtained from two extreme philosophies
of government: that of too much and of not enough government. We must ask: How much government is enough?
To what purposes is government legitimately and most
effectively employed? At what point does government
intervention intrude too dearly on civil liberties? When is
economic development and human progress best left to
private enterprise?
131See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND RE-

VIVAL OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY

116 (2000).

Using new language to confront problems can free us from doctrinal
rhetoric and ancient commitments, but it can be disturbing to those who
seek comfort in familiar labels. George Gershwin's masterpiece, Porgy
and Bess, confounded critics, because they did not know how to characterize a unique operatic composition for the Broadway stage about
African-Americans by a Jewish-American composer of popular music
and show tunes.
132
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Traditionally, this inquiry has been framed as a tension between individual liberties and public welfare, with
the implication that whatever balance we strike, we are
dealing with a zero-sum game. Politically, this tension
often reduces to a superficial left/right struggle, with those
on the left generally arguing for greater government intervention to promote the general welfare and those on the
right suggesting that overall welfare is best advanced by
limiting state intervention and maximizing individual liberty and initiative. When the discussion turns to national
defense and security issues, however, the roles are, more
often than not, reversed in American political discourse,
with conservatives tending to defer to government prerogatives to promote security for all and liberals suggesting, as
Benjamin Franklin did, that "Tho[s]e who would give up
ESSENTIAL LIBERTY to purcha[s]e a little TEMPORARY
33
SAFETY, de[s]erve neither LIBERTY nor SAFETY." 1
As a general philosophy, communitarians reject
both the extremes of radical individualism and repressive
authoritarianism. In the words of Amitai Etzioni, the
communitarian movement's founder, "A Communitarian
perspective recognizes both individual human dignity and
the social dimension of human existence." 134 Thus, while
government power is to be constrained by individual civil
liberties, government is nevertheless respected as a vehicle
(but not the exclusive vehicle) for social organization, as is
the need for some government intrusion in furtherance of
the greater good, be it in the form of taxes, military conscription, economic regulation or, where warranted,
searches of private persons and property. While government is neither the exclusive nor even necessarily the best
means of promoting social welfare, communitarians recog133See ROBERT JACKSON, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1759)

(quotation appears

on the title page and is widely attributed to Ben Franklin).
134 AMITAI ETZIONI, supra note 118, at 253.
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nize that it plays an essential role in this endeavor. In this
regard, communitarians do not feel obliged to adhere to the
political orthodoxies of the left or the right. And while
most communitarians would assert that all persons possess
certain natural rights, we recognize that most conflict situations call for a mutual adjustment of interests, rather
than a
35
contest as to whose rights trump those of others. 1
A communitarian view calls for neither government
abdication nor totalitarianism. At certain times and with
respect to certain ventures, government plays a necessary
and critical role, be it contending with a major hurricane,
defending the nation against terrorism, or educating our
young people. Sometimes it takes a village-or a state, or
a nation-to perform tasks essential to sustained existence
and development. The quandary is in determining just how
much government intervention is necessary to create opportunities for individuals to thrive, without stifling the initiative of those same individuals. Across-the-board bromides
and political sloganeering do us little good here. Rather, a
healthy dose of pragmatism is in order. Delineating the
limits of government intervention and responsibility, consistent with notions of communitarianism, is a core inquiry
necessary to the resolution of a multitude of problems we
face in a changing world.
B.

How much law?

An issue closely related to that of the extent of government intervention is how much law is needed to describe the parameters of that intervention. Our agenda will
sometimes require structural reforms or other legislation.
Universal health insurance and environmental regulation
(including even market-based regulation, such as a carbon
tax) require statutory measures to take hold. Many such
reforms, because of the complexity of the problems they
135 GLENDON, supra note

114, at 18-19.
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seek to address, will additionally require administrative
regulations for their implementation. Congress may enact a
carbon tax and might even include in such legislation a rate
of taxation, but it would remain for an administrative agency to determine how much carbon, subject to the tax, is
emitted from any given activity (or at least determine a way
of measuring it). Because many of our adjustments are
subtle, the scalpel will sometimes be more effective than
the meat cleaver. Garrett Hardin said several decades ago,
"Prohibition is easy to legislate (though not necessarily to
enforce); but how do we legislate temperance? Experience
indicates that it can be accomplished
best through the med36
iation of administrative law." 1
But as Hardin acknowledged, administrative law "is
rightly feared for an ancient reason-Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?-'Who shall watch the watchers themselves? ' '" 137 Indeed, more often than not, taking responsibility requires not more law, but more responsible
administration of existing law. Hardin continued, "The
great challenge facing us now is to invent the corrective
feedbacks that are needed to keep custodians honest. We
must find ways to legitimate the needed authority of both
' 38
the custodians and the corrective feedbacks."'
Ultimately, more responsible administration of existing law will occur only through the active engagement of
the citizenry. Congress can enact a ban on budgetary earmarks; it can just as easily revoke the ban. 139 Congress can
create FEMA to respond to disasters; it can also continue to
confirm the appointment of inept FEMA directors. A vigi136

Hardin, supra note 125, at 1246.

137 d. at
13

1 Id.

1245-46.

at 1246.

139 Apparently, divided government in and of itself does not guaranty

prudence. A supposedly reform-minded Democratic Congress, purportedly committed to eliminating earmarks, nevertheless managed to
insert a few into its first budget in 2007. Robert Pear, Select Hospitals
Reap a Windfall Under Child Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2007, at Al.
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lant public, aided by the press, is the best insurance against
lapses in official morality and competence. In this regard,
the solution is more often political rather than legal.
A generation of Americans (and in particular,
American lawyers) has seen how the courts in dramatic
cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education,14 1 have effected major transitions in society. As a consequence,
many of us have adopted a post-Brown mentality, in which
recourse to reformist litigation is seen as a cure-all for the
nation's ills. We should continue to avail ourselves of the
courts and the Constitution to preserve human rights. The
rights secured under Brown were critical to a nation that
needed to rid itself of the oppression of an apartheid system. But breakthrough cases like Brown, signaling a major
reordering of society, come by about once in a lifetime.
When the debate is more appropriately framed as an adjustment of interests, rather than as a competition among
rights, the political process, rather than the judicial process,
becomes the proper forum for decision-making. No writ of
mandamus will make Michael Brown a competent FEMA
Director; no judicial directive will craft a wise foreign
policy. The Supreme Court might declare the regulation of
greenhouse gases within EPA jurisdiction, 141 but the EPA
must still carry out the Court's mandate. Judicial and legislative remedies can take us only so far. The body politic
must demand more of its elected and appointed employees.
C.

The role of civil society.

Perhaps equally important as government to the
building and sustaining of community is the role of private
organizations and institutions. What political scientists call
"civil society"-a tapestry of voluntary associations such
as civic clubs, neighborhood organizations, corporations,
140 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
141Massachusetts v. EPA,

127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007).
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labor unions, religious institutions, charitable organizations,

educational institutions, and even Putnam's bowling leagues-plays a vital role in creating and maintaining the
social capital that allows societies to thrive. Sometimes
(and in some societies), these organizations stand in opposition to government authority, but in democracies, these
organizations usually act in tandem with government, as
mediating elements through which individuals join together
for social or economic action. "[C]ivil society [is] the
space between the individual and the state, the area where

private institutions, voluntary associations, free markets,
the free expression of ideas, and the free exercise of religion can be imagined or realized." 142 Voluntary and autonomous organizations "not only mediate between the
individual and the state, ... they also help make the 'life of
' 143
a society more full, rich, and varied."'

In his book, Better Together, Robert Putnam documents the efforts of a variety of community organizations
to improve the lot of the citizenry. 144 The organizations are
engaged in a variety of efforts: economic development,
neighborhood improvement, and literacy, to name a few.
For the most part, they involve grass-roots structures, organizations built from the ground up to deal with an identified problem or serve an identified clientele. While few of
these organizations are government agencies per se, almost
all of them use government as a means of advancing their
mission. While in some regimes, civil society must act as a
"parallel polis," in opposition to the state (e.g., the Solidarity movement in Communist Poland), that need not be the
case in a democracy. "The civil society does not act in
opposition to the democratic state, but cooperates with
142
W. Robert Connor, The Idea of a Civil Society, Conference Introduction
2 (National Humanities Center 1992).
143
Id. at 2-3 (quoting Anne Firor Scott).
'44 ROBERT PUTNAM, BETTER TOGETHER: RESTORING THE AMERICAN

COMMUNIrrY (2003).
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it."' 145 Even in a democracy, however, civil society can
play a useful monitoring function. We should consider
how civil society may complement or supplant government
with respect to certain activities, recognizing that many
functions are best performed by voluntary associations that
lack some of the constraints, as well as the coercive power,
of government.
D.

What level ofgovernment should intervene?

When government intervention is appropriate, at
what level should it intervene? As a general proposition,
communitarians would advocate government intervention
and regulation by the smallest governmental unit and at the
most local level possible. 146 The smallest governmental
units are most likely to be most responsive to immediate
needs and most likely to invoke the direct participation of
the individuals involved, thus wedding responsive government to individual responsibility. We should be wary of
those projects (like Alaska's Bridge to Nowhere) conceived
to meet purely local "needs" but which the locals are unwilling to fund on their own. 147 But some needs (the most
obvious of which is national defense) are so overwhelming
and universal so as to require governmental response on a
larger, more national scale. Some needs are intermediate in
nature. Should the federal government respond to a hurricane that has displaced thousands, or should the people of
New Orleans, or St. Charles Parish, or Louisiana, or Mississippi be left to respond on their own? What are the geo145Bronislaw

Geremek, Civil Society and the PresentAge, in THE IDEA
OF A CIVIL SOCIETY 11, 18 (1992), availableat
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/publications/civilsoc/geremek.htm
(last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
46 ETZIONI, supra note 118.

147 We should differentiate between such projects and those essential
functions such as education that address national needs but which some
localities are unable to fully fund.
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graphic dimensions of our "community"? Do they change
depending upon the circumstances addressed and the type
of intervention required? Does geography remain essential,
or is it even relevant to our definition of community in an
age of jet travel and electronic communications?
In the United States and some other countries, the
issue of the appropriate level of government response is
complicated by the principle of federalism, in which certain
entities (most notably, states and Indian tribes) are sovereigns with powers derived from sources other than the
central government. An American state or (to cite another
federal republic) German Land stands in a different relationship to the central authority in Washington or Berlin
than a French department or Chinese province has with
respect to Paris or Beijing. Does it make sense to regard
political subdivisions as sovereign units, or is this a matter
that should have been resolved definitively in the American
Civil War? Is a matter like public education (to cite just
one important example) a responsibility of each locality (as
in most of the United States), or is it regarded as a responsibility of the much larger community embodied in the state
(as in France)?
E.

Individualresponsibility.

A fifth communitarian theme of interest to us is that
of personal versus institutional responsibility. Some activities justify government intervention and regulation; with
respect to others, we are better off taking responsibility for
ourselves. Should the government regulate, for example,
the extraction of natural resources from environmentally
fragile lands, or should we leave it to the judgment and
altruism of corporations engaged in the exploitation of nonrenewable mineral resources to serve as stewards of the
environment? Should the government regulate the marketing of junk food to toddlers (as the New York Times advo-
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cated in a 2006 editorial1 48), or should we leave it to parents
to act responsibly and monitor the dietary intake of their
children? Must the State of California subsidize protection
from mudslides for coastal communities, or should people
be left to decide whether they will themselves pay the price
of living in a dangerous environment (through exposure to
danger or the cost of protection), while enjoying the benefits of an ocean view? Reasonable people will disagree
about these issues; in the very least, we should try to develop a framework for their principled consideration, rather
than defaulting to "squeaky-wheel-gets-the-grease" nostrums.
As a point of departure, I would suggest that the
case for individual, rather than collective, responsibility is
inversely correlated to the impact of one's conduct on others. The dietary intake of one's children, for example, has
an impact that is far more localized than that of drilling for
oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Common sense,
as well as respect for individual liberties, suggests that
certain decisions-and the responsibility that goes with
them-should be the province of the smallest community
unit, the family. But that does not grant us license to ignore
the sufferings of others or the interconnectedness of humanity. A broad range of human concerns demands our
engagement. We can isolate ourselves from neither genocide in Darfur nor the implications of global climate
change.
F.

Responsible intervention.

A related theme is the government's need to act
responsibly on our collective behalf. I have alluded earlier
to the problem of resorting to "painless" solutions to public
problems, like the accumulation of a growing amount of
148

Editorial, Selling Junk Food to Toddlers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,

2006, at A26.
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public debt in lieu of raising taxes. These solutions are
really not painless at all, as they merely postpone the day of
reckoning and force members of the next generation to pay
for commitments their parents have made. Even those of
us who are so cautious as to minimize our personal debt
(more and more a rarity in our debt-obsessed culture) are
forced to take on our share of the public debt. Pay-as-yougo strategies, on the other hand, have the additional benefit
of requiring the decision-maker to count the cost. 149 If a
war (on Iraq or on poverty) is not worth paying for, is it
really worth fighting? 150
Related to this inquiry is that of internalization of
costs. With respect to both public and private courses of
action, is it possible to internalize costs in such a way that
the actors pay the full price of their activities, including the
costs they might impose on others in the absence of regulation? For example, might Americans become more prudent
in their consumption of non-renewable, carbon-based fuels,
and more frequently avail themselves of public transportation, if the environmental costs of driving were fully incorporated into the cost of gasoline? Market-based solutions,
such as the carbon tax, promote responsible decisionmaking by making actors-be they individuals, corporate
bodies, or governments-count the costs. The role of government here becomes the proper assessment and enforcement of the true costs of carbon use and emissions, so as to
eliminate the freeloader phenomenon that occurs when

149

The same case can be made for localization of decision making, and

the funding necessary to support it. If the potential users of an Alaskan

bridge-to-nowhere are unwilling to pay for it, why should Washington?
150 The "other people's money" problem discussed in the preceding
note finds its analogy in the war-making context, specifically the expenditure of other people's lives. If we make war, we should be willing

to place our own lives at risk, not just those of the poor.
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people are allowed
to impose costs on others without pay151
freight.
the
ing
G.

Regardfor long-term consequences.

A corollary to the theme of responsibility is due regard for the long-term consequences of one's actions, be
they private or public. While little of the communitarian
literature to date has focused on this theme, its relationship
to communitarianism is apparent. The following acts are
among those consistent with the theme of responsibility: to
pay one's own debts, to clean up one's own messes, and to
leave one's surroundings for the better, not the worse, for
one's having been here. Annual federal budget deficits
mean that someone else will have to pay for today's felt
necessities. Economic stimulants and foreign adventures
may be priorities, but previous generations fought two
world wars and a depression during the first half of the
twentieth century without encumbering us with a fraction
of the debt we now propose to pass on to our heirs. Environmental responsibility may be of even greater importance, as the effects of environmental degradation can be
permanent in ways that deficits need not be. We cannot
dredge the Mississippi, mine the canyon lands of Utah, fill
the air with hydrocarbons, or contribute to the demise of
hundreds of other species without contemplating the consequences. The old Native American saying holds true: The
land is not a gift from our ancestors; it is a loan from our
children.
Al Gore (who has long warned about the peril of
global warming) has suggested that "[w]hat changed in the
Government does this with regularity through the tort liability system by making the courts available to people for redress against those
who have harmed them A carbon tax is a superior device in that it
carries with it a formulaic consistency and fairness not associated with
jury verdicts. It should incorporate the cost of resource depletion as
well as the cost of pollution.
151
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U.S. with Hurricane Katrina was a feeling that we have
entered a period of consequences." 1 52 But public responsibility for large-scale consequences has always been a more
difficult concept to embrace than that of individual responsibility. Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the politics
of the day is the failure to account for the future consequences of present-day policy. We plunge trillions of dollars into debt, mortgaging our children's future to the
central banks of East Asia. We turn a blind eye toward
global warming, ascribing the threat to "junk science." We
commence a war on Iraq, declaring "mission accomplished," without contemplating the difficult occupation
that lies ahead.
What the first President Bush derisively referred to
as "the vision thing" may be the greatest deficit in current
formulations of public policy. Critics of the second Bush
Administration's environmental policies suggest that its
links to corporate America have caused it to place greed
above the common good. 153 But it may not be so much that
Bush and his loyalists are greedy; they may simply lack the
foresight to comprehend the long-term consequences of
their actions. During the Reagan Administration, Interior
Secretary James Watt's seeming disregard for the environment was attributed (probably unfairly) to an apocalyptic
vision: the long-term prospects for the environment were
thought to be of no consequence, because the physical
environment was about to be destroyed by the hand of
God. 154 An other-worldly view of things may similarly
affect current policies.

(Paramount Classics 2006).

152AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH
153See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE: How

GEORGE W. BUSH AND His CORPORATE PALS ARE PLUNDERING THE

COUNTRY AND HIJACKING OUR DEMOCRACY 190-99 (2004); PHILLIPS,
supra note 110.
15See Phillips, supra note 110 at 63. Phillips suggests that Watt's

concern about an imminent Second Coming justified, in his mind,
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Alternatively, the lack of vision may have more
mundane explanations. The problem with the Katrina response may have been similar to the recurring complaint
about the Pentagon-that our generals are always fighting
the last battle. In the post-9/11 period, the government
installed a vast and inconvenient security apparatus to protect the homeland from the last threat-that of terrorists
flying airplanes into skyscrapers-and neglected the next
one-an environmental calamity, caused by terrorists or
natural causes. Mother Nature may have treated us to Katrina; the poisoning of urban drinking water or the unleashing of a "dirty bomb" in some major metropolitan area may
be the next surprise Al-Qaeda has cooked up for us. Indeed, people are working on this critical issue, but it does
not appear that our government has attached
the urgency or
155
deserves.
it
that
issue
the
to
resources
It is not as if the party out of power excels at longterm planning. If the Republicans have a time horizon of
about one month, the Democrats often seem to have a horizon of seventy-five years-into the past. But efforts to
depart from this mind-set have produced mixed results.
Over a decade ago, in an effort to fashion a "third way,"
Clinton-era Democrats joined market-minded Republicans
in rejecting protectionism and embracing free trade. But by
failing to insist that our trading partners adopt measures to
protect labor and the environment, we may have placed our
own industries and workers at a disadvantage while exacerbating environmental degradation and exploitation of labor
in other parts of the world.
The traditional liberal nostrums of redistribution
and regulation have merit in some circumstances. Vast and
better stewardship of natural resources in anticipation of that reckoning.

See Steve Coil, The Unthinkable: Can the UnitedStates Be Made
Safe from Nuclear Terrorism?, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 2007, at
48.
155
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still-growing disparities in wealth (and access to it) may
justify the former, and environmental imperatives may
require the latter. Not all solutions can be market-based.
But solutions that internalize externalities (e.g., by using a
carbon tax to incorporate environmental costs into prices)
may produce the most efficient results and remain largely
untried. Such solutions combine the best elements of the
with markets and the liberal infatuaconservative obsession
156
regulation.
tion with
The Dutch polder experience in the years following
World War II demonstrates how disparate political parties,
religious groups, and economic interests can unite for the
common good and address pressing needs. We must recognize that current security, environmental, and fiscal demands are, like those that demanded the Dutch polder
effort, an existential matter. To confront these demands, a
new politics of community and responsibility must replace
the old partisan bickering. As Lincoln said in another era,
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to
the stormy present. The occasion is piled high
with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think

156

CompareClean Energy Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (2007) (as

passed by House), and Renewable Fuels, Consumer Protection, and
Energy Efficiency Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (2007) (as

amended and passed by Senate) (encompassing a variety of regulatory
measures, such as more stringent automobile mileage regulations), with
Robert B. Reich, The Best Ideafor Reducing Global Warming, THE
AM. PROSPECT, June 20, 2007, availableat

http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article--the-best-idea-for-reducing
__global-warming_ (advocating cap-and-trade approach), and Interview

by Scott Jagow with Robert Reich, Professor of Public Policy at the
University of California at Berkley (June 20, 2007) (advocating carbon
tax).
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anew and act anew. We must disenthrall157ourselves, and then we shall save our country.
H.

Being a good neighbor.

The final communitarian theme we should address
is the importance of behaving as good neighbors. Being a
good neighbor means more than conforming to that which
is legally required. A focus on legal rights alone ignores
the informal relationships and voluntary undertakings that
are essential to the societal fabric. "Buried deep in our
rights dialect," writes communitarian Mary Ann Glendon,
"is an unexpressed premise that we roam at large in a land
of strangers, where we presumptively have no obligations
toward others except to avoid the active infliction of
harm." 158 It would be a sad land indeed if we regarded our
obligations to others as merely congruent with our legal
obligations and failed to recognize our interdependence.
Compare, if you will, the defensive, fearful post-Katrina
response of the officials of Gretna, Louisiana (who barred
dislocated New Orleans residents from their streets) with
that of their counterparts in Houston, Texas. By opening
their public facilities, their schools, and their arms to those
displaced by Katrina, Houston's citizens may have momentarily diluted their material resources, but they built a priceless store of social capital from which they are likely to
reap returns for years to come.
The same notion of "neighborliness" may be attached to international affairs. In his recent book, From
Empire to Community, Amitai Etzioni envisions a transition
from a "might makes right" philosophy in foreign relations
to the development of institutions and communal bonds to

157Abraham

Lincoln, The President's State of the Union Address to
Congress (Dec. 1, 1862).
158GLENDON, supra note 114, at 77.
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establish human primacy. 159 Gunboat diplomacy and
bombing raids may provide temporary gains, but in an age
of global terrorism, real security is obtained only through
collaboration.
Determining the parameters of effective government action, recognizing both the potency and limitations
of law, delineating the boundary between public and private, defining the role of civil society, discerning the respective roles of governments at different levels, acting
responsibly, planning for the future, and caring for our
neighbors: these are considerations that can frame principled discussion. As events from Chernobyl to Katrina
have demonstrated, these issues are too important to be
dispatched with familiar labels or partisan rhetoric. We
must honestly acknowledge inconvenient facts, engage in
principled discourse, and recognize that our future depends
on a web of relationships and the enlightened employment
of governance mechanisms.
To some, the principles suggested in this essay will
appear naive. Self-interest dominates human endeavor, the
public-choice theorists would say, and to profess otherwise
is wishful thinking worthy only of Pollyanna or Candide.
Government can never be trusted, the cynics warn us. But
disaster lies in the unmitigated pursuit of self-interest, just
as surely as it lies in the unfettered power of government.
The consequences of heedless pursuit of selfish ends at one
extreme, or of forfeiture of all initiative to government at
the other, are too dire, and furnish no realistic vision of a
livable future. Better for us to seek a proper balance, to
build community, and to trust what Lincoln called "the
60
better angels of our nature."'

159 AM1TAI ETZIONI, FROM EMPIRE TO COMMUNrrYpassim (2004).
160

Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861).

